Introduction
In most federations today, both federal and state governments raise taxes on the same -or at least interdependent-tax bases. Inevitably then, tax policies of one government have an impact on revenues raised by other governments, as well as on the welfare of residents living in other states.
1 Now, whether strategically or unwittingly, governments often ignore such eects of own taxation on other parties. Misjudging the`true' social cost of public provision, policy makers are then thrown o by tax externalities making their decisions, leading to an inecient mix of public and private consumption. In this chapter we revisit these ineciencies and their implications, which come in many forms.
As soon as tax bases can move freely between states for one, horizontal externalities bring about suboptimal levels of taxation and public provision. The textbook`race to the bottom' scenario is often given as the example here, 2 although other outcomes are certainly possible.
3 If the tax base is co-occupied by the federal and state governments moreover, vertical externalities enter the fray. Here the externality works through the shared tax base, which may contract as states ratchet up tax levels. When the resulting negative eect on federal tax revenues is overlooked by the states, regional taxes as well as public provision come out ineciently high compared to the second-best unitary optimum.
4 But when taxes are levied on an ad valorem basis, such vertical externalities can just as well have the opposite eect as shown by Dahlby and Wilson (2003) . Now, since both types of externalities often take eect simultaneously -and can work in opposite directions-the question becomes what their joint eect will be. Indeed, if horizontal externalities work against their vertical counterparts, the kind of welfare losses described above start wearing thin or could even fully cancel out. First tackled by Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002) with a focus on capital mobility, tax base elasticities and the relative size of the federal government are shown to be crucial factors in this trade-o.
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Building on these results, Brülhart and Jametti (2006) employ a novel empirical specication conrming vertical externalities as observables, rather than theoretical curiosities. Devereux et al. (2007) focus on excise taxation lastly, laying out the impact of cross-border shopping and transport costs. What remains is the labour market, marking a blind spot as yet overlooked in the literature: the eect of inter-state commuting, which is where our theoretical contribution comes in.
Unlike most work so far, which targets inter-state migration as the main driver of horizontal labour tax externalities, 6 we thus move beyond the standard approach geared towards Anglo-Saxon countries. Consider for example a situation with Belgian features, 1 Throughout this paper, we focus on the regional tier within a federation: the state level. Our ndings would also apply to the municipal level however, even within a two-tiered unitary state.
2 Wilson (1986) and Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) provide the seminal formal derivations. For a survey of the empirical literature on horizontal interactions, see Brueckner (2003) .
3 Keen and Marchand (1997) discuss the overprovision of productive inputs. McLure (1967) , Krelove (1992) or De Borger et al. (2007) consider tax exporting. See also Lockwood (2001) for a theoretical synthesis of commodity tax competition. 4 See Dahlby (1996) , Boadway and Keen (1996) or Boadway et al. (1998) for the theoretical outlay. Esteller-Moré and Solé-Ollé (2001) and Andersson et al. (2004) deliver empirical evidence.
5 Wilson and Janeba (2005) add one more dimension, by endogenising the degree of decentralisation in Nash-competing federations. 6 The last section in Boadway and Keen (1996) forms a notable exception, yet also here clearing regional labour markets drive wage formation. 1 where at least 10% of the workforce commutes between states but households as a whole rarely migrate.
7 Since there is no inter-state migration in this case, relying on the conventional framework would only leave us with vertical externalities to analyse. 8 In our model on the other hand, horizontal policy eects are re-introduced through commuting ows.
Wages are set in an integrated, national labour market, so that changes in one state are felt throughout the entire federal system even when household migration does not occur. In other words, we translate the model of Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002) to a labour market
setting. Yet by introducing an ad valorem, residence based labour tax, we also extend it.
Indeed, when the commuting labour force is taxed ad valorem, vertical externalities can be of either sign which re-routes the interplay with their horizontal antagonists. This adds to the novelty of our results.
First, a fully decentralised labour tax brings about ineciently low levels of taxation and public provision. An outcome which chimes well with the conventional -tax competitionreasoning. But in stead of attracting more workers by lowering taxes, the underlying political motives run dierently here. Although states in our model are out to boost tax revenues as well, their attention limits itself to own workers. Since labour is taxed in the state of residence, revenues can only go up if own-residents are induced to work more, and work incentives of non-residents are impeded. A lower state tax rate, implying a higher net wage in the tax-raising state and lower net wages in other states, achieves exactly this.
This for the simple reason that in an integrated labour market, local tax cuts pull the market clearing gross wage down. The fact that taxation is ad valorem only amplies this mechanism.
When the tax base is co-occupied by the federal and state governments secondly, either under-or overtaxation can occur. Our model identies conditions for states to overtax, i.e.
for the overall scal externality to be negative. Low labour supply elasticities combined with highly responsive labour demand nation-wide turn out to be crucial here. However, the latter eect comes out less pronounced because taxation is ad valorem, which brings in the impact of the federation-wide gross wage increase on revenues. In other words, when taxation is levied ad valorem, undertaxation is more liable to occur than under unit taxation. For the same underlying reasons, scal equalisation is also expected to give less cause for overtaxation.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1 provides some background on the literature and elaborates on the key ideas. Section 2 introduces the model.
Employing a unitary country focus, the second-best optimum is characterised in section 3.
The following section then allows for varying degrees of decentralisation, so that externalities enter the fray. In section 4.1, state governments have full discretion over scal policy, whilst in section 4.2 the federal and state governments share the labour tax base. Section 5 introduces a scal equalisation mechanism, after which section 6 concludes.
7 More commuting examples; Switzerland, Germany,..? Case can be made for all densely populated federations. 8 In fact, and to the best of our knowledge, only Boadway and Keen (1996) have considered both horizontal and vertical externalities caused by labour induced migration in a coherent framework.
I.
Background
Making sense of locational ineciencies in labour markets, theoretical approaches usually have one thing in common: workers only supply labour in their own state of residence, and not in other states.
9 Fitted to Anglo-Saxon conditions on the ground, such models then tend to favour inter-state migration over commuting as a primary focus of analysis.
As argued above, this perspective has its limits in the absence of household migration, which is where our model lls in the blanks. If migration ows were to dry up entirely, commuting still allows for horizontal bias. Rather surprisingly moreover, our approach serves the exact same purpose at the other end of the mobility-spectrum, where migration is perfectly mobile.
Indeed, when migration is fully costless and unobstructed by other barriers, the kind of horizontal externalities described earlier are fully internalised, resulting in an optimal mix of public and private consumption. The only precondition here, as Boadway (1982) Also under a scenario of perfect mobility consequently, where horizontal externalities would otherwise cancel out because of such`incentive equivalence', does our model oer a wider scope. As was the case when migration didn't take place at all, the optimal mix of public and private consumption can still be thrown o by allowing for commuting. When household mobility is less than fully perfect however, the optimal outcome can be distorted by other factors as well. Mansoorian and Myers (1993) e.g. were rst to analyse the eect of varying degrees of home attachment -leading to costly migration-on government decision making. Wellisch (2000) goes on to discuss alternative relaxations to the initial model, under which 'incentive equivalence' is expected to break down as well. In all of these cases however, commuting still has a potentially amplifying part to play among more conventional distortions.
An argument which holds just the same when it comes to other kinds of locational ineciencies, due for example to the inecient allocation of households across states. But since such welfare losses are directly caused by individuals -as described by Buchanan and Goetz (1972) or Flatters et al. (1974) , and recently revisited by Albouy (2012)-rather than by inecient government decision making, they are of lesser interest here.
9 This work ranges from the seminal contributions of Buchanan and Goetz (1972) , Flatters et al. (1974) , and Boadway and Flatters (1982) , to Boadway and Keen (1996) , Wildasin (1991 Wildasin ( , 2000 , Richter and Wellisch (1996) , Wellisch and Wildasin (1996) and Sato (2000 
with w i the gross wage in state i. As a result, labour demand L Di is implicitly dened by
Production is used for private as well as public consumption, with a marginal rate of transformation of 1. Prot taxes θ (i) , when included, are exogenously xed. Turning to the consumer side of our economy, the representative household of state i derives utility from private consumption, public provision, and leisure.
That is,
with C i the consumption of a composite (numeraire) private good, L Si labour supply, and G (F ) i state and federal publicly provided private goods.
) is concave and increasing in both G i and G F i respectively. As in Kotsogiannis and Martínez (2008) , public provision is nanced by an ad valorem tax on labour income, which is levied according to the residence principle.
Denoted by t i for the states and T for the federal government, the consolidated labour tax for state i becomes τ i = t i + T .
Each household then maximises (2) subject to its budget constraint: C i =w i L i + π i , withw i = (1 − τ i )w i the net wage. As a result, labour supply L Si (w i ) is implicitly dened by u Ci (.)w i + u Li = 0 and assumed increasing, so that L Si (w i ) > 0. Indirect utility is then given by
Crucially, households in each state i are immobile, but are free to work in any state of their choosing. A common inter-state labour market thus allows for commuting, where labour itself is costlessly mobile and commuting ows equilibrate gross wages across all states.
Since state populations are normalised to 1, this implies that states where labour supply L Si outweighs labour demand L Di are marked by commuting outows, and vice versa.
13
10 A common assumption in the literature focusing on similar eciency issues, see e.g. Kotsogiannis (2002, 2004) , Lucas (2004) , Brülhart and Jametti (2006) , Aronsson and Blomquist (2008) or Kotsogiannis (2010) .
11 A subscript denotes the derivative of a function of several variables whereas a prime denotes the derivative of a function of one variable.
12 Note that since we have normalised population to 1, these could just as well be pure public goods as in Kotsogiannis and Martínez (2008) . 13 Here, normalised state populations keep us from introducing a commuting cost. Since such a cost would not change our core results however, we can safely omit it. Also, commuting from one state to another will -at least in the kind of dense population settings we are targeting here-often be as costly as commuting from one city to another within the same state.
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Denoting the n-vector of consolidated tax rates by τ ≡ (τ 1 , ..., τ n ), the gross wage w(τ ) clearing the common labour market is implicitly dened by
Taking the total dierential with respect to τ i of (4) yields
with η i > 0 labour supply, and ε i < 0 labour demand elasticities in state i. Throughout the analysis we conne most of our attention to symmetric equilibria, in which all states set the same tax rate (t i = t, ∀i). The gross wage in such an equilibrium then becomes
So that, still in symmetric equilibrium and using (5), we also get
Logically, since marginally increasing the common state tax rate τ has a federation-wide impact, the gross wage will respond dierently compared to a state-specic tax hike. Indeed, from (7) we nd the latter to be smaller. As the gross wage starts to rise in the state raising its taxes, more and more workers from other states will ock to this region, mitigating the gross wage increase. When n were to go to innity, the gross wage eect will be fully countered by the commuting response, as can be seen in expression (5) or (7).
The marginal tax burden then falls entirely on the state in question through the drop in net wages, as ∂wi
The eects of taxation on net wages can then be written as
and
Lastly, the eect of marginally increased taxation on prots -which is the same for state as well as federal taxation-is given by
14 All derivations of the wage eects used throughout the paper are given in appendix A.
5
III.
Second-best optimum in a`unitary' country
We start with the benchmark case of a unitary country, where states are given no taxing or spending powers and the federal level makes all the calls. Here, the federal government sets a uniform tax rate τ to nance consolidated public provision. Since in this case tax externalities will not arise, the second-best outcome under distortionary taxation is attained.
We furthermore assume the federal government can tailor public provision (G (F ) i ) to the preferences of the representative household living in each state i, thus ruling out ineciencies at the federal level working through policy uniformity. Other arguments in favour of more decentralisation described in chapter 1, such as enhanced accountability, cost-eectiveness or innovation, are also omitted. This way, the second-best optimum as we
describe it in what follows, will always be welfare superior to the decentralised outcomes discussed in the following sections. It hence serves as the ideal benchmark. Moreover, inter-state spill-overs of public provision are excluded as well, keeping the focus strictly on tax externalities as a source of lower-level ineciency.
Keeping things simple, we will assume states to be perfectly symmetric. Also, prots accrue entirely to the representative household living in the state where rents are realised.
In section VI of the paper both assumptions will in turn be relaxed. Since we do not deal with redistributional issues lastly, and consider just one identical representative household per state, the federal government simply maximises a Utilitarian welfare function given by
subject to its budget constraint given by
where the values of τ , G F i and G i are chosen by the government. Using symmetry, (6), and (12), the rst-order conditions readily reduce to 15
with λ the marginal utility of income. Equations (13), together with the budget constraint (12), characterize the second-best optimum denoted by (τ * , G * , G F * ) for each state i. At the unitary optimum, τ is set such that the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between both the publicly provided good and the private good must be equal to the Marginal Cost of Public Funds (MCPF). As is well known, the MCPF is the eciency cost of raising revenue with a distortionary tax (Dahlby, 2008) . Indeed, equations (13) are the usual optimality conditions for public provision in a distorted economy, being simplied versions of the standard Atkinson and Stern (1974) rule.
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15 The optimisation problem is written out, and solved, in appendix B. 16 The Atkinson-Stern rule includes an additional term in the numerator, capturing the eect of changes in public provision on tax revenues. Because utility is additively seperable, this relation does not bite in our model.
IV.

Decentralised taxation
We now consider various degrees of decentralised scal decision making, setting the stage for tax externalities to come about. To fully understand the interplay of horizontal and vertical externalities, we rst study the horizontal interaction in isolation. A setting where taxation is fully decentralised -and vertical externalities are as a result assumed away-then serves as the logical stepping stone to the more complex shared tax base case.
IV.1. Full tax autonomy
Here, scal decision making is fully decentralised to the state level, and each state i levies a labour tax t i to nance the publicly provided goods G i and G 
subject to state i's budget constraint, given by
Using (5) and (15), and evaluated in symmetric equilibrium, we obtain the following characterisation:
Lemma 1 With households immobile, but workers commuting to other states, the MCPF of a state government with full tax autonomy is given by
Equations (16), together with the budget constraint (15), dene the decentralised Nash equilibrium denoted by (τ * , G * , G F ).
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Also in the fully decentralised case in other words, does public provision continue until the marginal rate of substitution between both the publicly provided good and the private good is equal to the marginal cost of public funds (MCPF). However, this eciency cost overlooks all eects of own taxation on other states. The cost of raising revenue as it is perceived by the state government, therefore weighs in more or less than the socially relevant cost derived in section 3. To verify the sign of this bias, we compare the unitary MCPF which was unaected by externalities, to the state MCPF captured by lemma 1.
The resulting trade-o, evaluated at the symmetric Nash-equilibrium, then gives us Proposition 1 When state governments have full tax autonomy and workers commute, positive tax externalities lead to ineciently low levels of taxation and public provision.
17 Proofs of both lemma 1 and proposition 1 are given in appendix C.
7 Or, to put it otherwise, the state MCPF will be biased upwards. Because the eect of state taxation on other states is not included in the state welfare cost, and because this eect is proven to be positive, state governments perceive the cost of distortionary taxation to be higher than it actually is. As a result, state taxation as well as public provision are set at ineciently low levels compared to the second-best outcome derived in section III.
Consequently, if the state government were to internalise the positive externality in its welfare cost calculations, the cost would weigh in precisely at its socially relevant level.
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Now, to understand all of the eects underpinning proposition 1, we re-write the marginal cost of public funds derived under lemma 1 in its most basic form
What this rewritten eciency cost of state taxation shows, is that the positive externality comes two-sided. In the denominator of (17) the impact of a tax hike in region i on the tax revenues n j =i R j of other states is left out. Whilst the numerator omits the direct eects on non-resident welfare n j =i V j as well. Starting with the`indirect' revenue eects in the denominator, these can be written as
What we learn from (18), and contrary to a scenario employing unit taxation, is that state taxation has two eects on the budgets of other states. Due to the gross wage increase rstly, which is identical across states because of commuting, tax bases in other states rise alongside collected tax revenues. Second, since other states keep their tax rates constant, net wages in these states follow gross wage hikes so that more labour is supplied. This also fattens state coers, and would be the only eect under unit taxation.
Turning to the denominator of (17), the omitted direct impact of own taxation on non-resident welfare is given by
Here we nd that higher net wages not only improve non-resident welfare through increased public provision, as before in (18), but also simply because purchasing power comes out reinforced. Furthermore, all three eects combined appear to dominate the negative direct eect on non-resident welfare, which is the drop in collected prots due to the higher gross wage.
In addition, the higher the amount of regions in the federation, the stronger the positive externality and subsequent welfare losses. A result reminiscent of Hoyt (1991) or Keen and 18 This point is illustrated formally in appendix C.
8 Kotsogiannis (2004) . This can also easily be seen in (58), where a higher n relatively nudges up the left hand side of the expression.
Looking at these ineciencies from a more strategic angle lastly, the political incentives behind proposition 1 are rather dierent from other interpretations in the literature.
Indeed, by setting taxes at ineciently low levels, state governments aren't out to attract more workers as they would in the standard competition case. Contrarily, their aim is to boost labour supplied by own residents, and impede work incentives of non-residents.
Reducing state taxation ts that purpose: the net wage of own residents will increase and provide a boost to own labour supply. Whilst the net wage of non-residents goes down together with overall gross wages, undercutting non-resident willingness to work.
Nonetheless, since all states are identical and follow the same strategy, we arrive at a familiar outcome: a sub-optimal welfare level where all taxes are set too low.
IV.2. Shared tax base
We now move on to the case where both the federal and state governments levy taxes on labour, giving rise to horizontal and vertical tax externalities at the same time. The federal government now sets a uniform tax rate T to tailor public provision (G F i ) to the preferences of each representative household, thus maximising (11) subject to:
On top of this, each state raises additional taxes to nance own public provision (G i ).
Following the literature, we assume the federal government sees through states' budget constraints, so there will be no`top-down' vertical externality. We also continue to assume that all governments behave non-cooperatively -taking each other's policies as given-and that states are identical in every way. Since under these assumptions federal decision making is equivalent to the unitary outcome derived in section III, we can jump straight to the state level. The government of state i now maximises (14) subject to
Using (7), 9 and (21), and evaluated in symmetric equilibrium, we arrive at the following characterisation:
Lemma 2 With households immobile, but workers commuting to other states, the MCPF of a state government sharing its labour tax base with the federal government, is given by
Expression (22), together with the budget constraint (21), denes the Nash equilibrium, denoted by (t * , G * ).
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19 Proofs of lemma 2 and proposition 2 are given in appendix D.
9 Again, public provision continues until the marginal rate of substitution between both the publicly provided good and the private good is equal to the marginal cost of public funds (MCPF). Moreover, not only does this eciency cost overlook all (positive) horizontal eects of own taxation on other states, it also fails to internalise the vertical eects. Now, as touched upon in the introduction, these vertical eects can be positive as well as negative. Negative, since a state tax hike induces a higher federation-wide gross wage, which curtails federation-wide labour demand. And since the labour market clears at the national level, this brings about lower federation-wide labour supply, and by consequence, shrinking federal tax receipts. However, and crucially, since the labour income tax base is taxed ad valorem, the same gross wage increase also boosts the tax base. This then has a positive eect on federal coers.
In short, the positive horizontal externalities established in the previous section can be hollowed out, or reinforced, by their vertical counterparts. To nd out which eect comes out on top, and thus to determine the sign of the overall externality, we again compare the unitary MCPF with the state eciency cost. Evaluated in the symmetric Nash-equilibrium, using lemma 2 and (13), we obtain:
Proposition 2 In a federation where workers can commute between identical states, where households as a whole do not migrate, and both the federal and state governments tax labour income, the overall externality:
1. Is positive when labour supply is highly responsive to changes in the net wage, and federation-wide labour demand is inelastic 2. Is negative when labour supply is relatively inelastic compared to labour demand, and the federal level accounts for the larger part of public provision 3. Disappears as soon as labour supply is unaected by the net wage
When the overall externality is negative, state over-taxation and over-provision ensue. In this case the upward pressure on the perceived state eciency cost is more than undone by the vertical eects, which turn out to be negative. If, on the other hand, the state MCPF stays well above the second-best eciency cost, the positive eects -horizontal as well as possibly vertical-on non-resident welfare will have prevailed. We then end up with under-provision and under-taxation, similar to the outcome under full tax autonomy in the previous section.
Earlier results by Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002) thus seem to carry through in our setting here, where vertical externalities can turn either way. Zoom in on the underlying factors driving proposition 2 however, and an important dierence emerges. Although tax base elasticities play a crucial part in our setting as well, ad valorem taxation renders their interplay less clear cut, bringing about less overtaxation in general.
To shed more light on this mechanism, and using (1), (3), (4) and (21), we write the welfare of the representative household in state i as
Reformulating state optimisation expressed by (14) and (21) above, state i then chooses its tax rate t i to maximize (23), taking all other tax rates as given. The necessary rst order condition for this, evaluated in symmetric equilibrium and making use of (7) and (10), becomes
Condition (24) is nothing more than lemma 2 in rewritten form, implicitly dening the equilibrium state tax rate t * , again given T * set by the federal government and the number of states n.
20 The rst term of (24) reects the direct utility loss incurred by the representative household because of increased state taxation, working through the decreasing net wage and falling prots. The second term, involving Γ G , expresses the eect of a state tax hike on state government revenues. Crucially, since taxes are levied ad valorem, this could either inict utility losses or gains. A tax hike depresses the net wage and consequently labour supply, but also pushes up the federation-wide gross wage, so the eect on revenues is ambiguous. Now, to bring potential tax externalities to the surface by means of (24), we rst write out welfare in symmetric equilibrium and under full information. Using (1), (3), (4), (20) and (21), we obtain 21
Dierentiating (25) with respect to the common tax rate t, which is equivalent to a coordinated tax increase in all states, then yields
where the third term reects the impact of state taxation on welfare through Γ G F and federal tax revenues. Now, since setting (26) equal to zero implicitly denes the socially optimal state tax rate, the sign of W t evaluated at the Nash-equilibrium established in (24) is vital. If W t turns out to be positive at this point, a slight increase in state tax rates would improve overall welfare. Hence, tax rates in the non-cooperative equilibrium dened by (24) -or lemma 2-were set ineciently low from a social viewpoint. Conversely, when W t is negative, state taxes were set too high. To investigate the sign of (26) at the Nash equilibrium (t * , T * ) we subtract (24) from (26), so that
Since w is unambiguously positive, the sign of (27) hinges on the terms between square brackets. On the left we nd the eects of state taxation on other states, reecting the horizontal externalities. As described above, these operate through non-resident purchasing 20 Where the federal tax rate T * comes in through the consolidated tax rate τ dening w(τ ). 21 Note how, under symmetric equilibrium, the federal budget constraint (20) reduces to G F = T L D (w(τ )w(τ ), using the market clearing condition (4). power, incurred rents and state tax revenues.
22 On the right of (27) on the other hand, the impact of a state tax hike on the federal budget is spelled out. As L D < 0, shrinking federation-wide labour demand comes in via L D w, whilst the positive twist of the gross wage increase is expressed by L D . Now, we see that (27) turns positive when labour supply becomes more responsive to changes in the net wage (L S ↑), and labour demand less sensitive to gross wage movements (L D ↓). More so, this latter eect is strengthened by a higher state tax rate t * , in itself a result of a higher appreciation of state public provision Γ G . Inversely, and coming full circle on points (1) and (2) of proposition 2, inelastic labour supply and highly responsive labour demand amplify the negative eects in (27), as will a higher utility share of federal public provision Γ G F . Setting L S = 0 in (6) lastly, also reduces w and by consequence the whole of (27) to zero, as captured by point (3) of proposition 2.
So far our results chime well with Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002) , even though the strict demarcation between positive horizontal, and negative vertical externalities breaks down in our setting. Where (27) diverges signicantly from earlier work however, is in the degree to which the negative eects are expected to bite. Take for example a scenario where federation-wide labour demand is highly elastic, whilst labour supply is not. As a result, a state tax hike reduces the federation-wide tax base considerably, whilst commuting ows are slow to arbitrage away income dierentials. Under unit taxation, W t can therefore easily be expected to turn negative in the Nash equilibrium, with overtaxation at the state level as a result. But when the tax is levied at valorem, the overall gross wage increase has a second part to play. Marked with a (+) sign in (27), we see how w indeed boosts tax revenues at the state and federal level, aside from its interaction with labour supply and demand responsiveness. These latter wage eects would not arise if, rather than full labour income L S w here, only labour supply L S had been taxed. We summarise this result in the following corollary:
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Corollary 1 When dierent levels of government levy ad valorem taxes on a shared tax base, lower-level governments are less likely to overtax than under unit taxation.
Corollary 1 then suggests that undertaxation, underprovision and -from a strategic perspectivetax competition will more often than not hold sway over other outcomes, even when the vertical dimension is taken up in the analysis. In the next section, we investigate whether the same friction between ad valorem and unit taxation carries over to equalisation grant mechanisms.
V. Revenue equalisation and ad valorem taxation
Suppose now an equalisation mechanism is in place in our federation. Such a mechanism corrects for dierences in scal capacity across the various states, levelling out (a degree of ) the divergence. The underlying principle here is mainly one of horizontal equity, ensuring each state has sucient revenues at its disposal to provide a minimum level of public services, without having to rely on draconian levels of taxation.
24 22 We assume Γ G is such that, in line with proposition 1, these sum up to be positive. 23 We derive the sucient conditions for corollary 1 to hold in general, in appendix D. 24 Eciency arguments can also be provided in favour of equalisation, see e.g. Boadway and Shah (2009) .
We assume an equalisation mechanism of the conventional sort. Here, the per capita equalisation grant ω i to each state i is given by the dierence between its scal capacity and a benchmark scal capacity, multiplied by a standard -usually average-federal tax rate: 
A tax hike in state i thus inuences the equalisation grants via two channels: through the change in the average state tax rate (given scal capacity), and through a change in the actual scal capacities. In symmetric equilibrium, (29) becomes
Now, whilst under unit taxation the equalisation grant would only compensate for the negative eect of a shrinking tax base on scal capacity, (30) again tells a dierent story.
Indeed, when taxation is ad valorem, a state tax hike also ratchets up the scal capacity through the gross wage eect. The equalisation grant owing back to the state increasing its tax rate is therefore stemmed.
VI. Concluding remarks
As one of the smallest federations in Europe, Belgium makes for an interesting case study.
Counting only three sub-central entities (states), each with diverging preferences and productivity, it enjoys a very high degree of cross-state commuting. Zooming in on these commuting ows brings out a blind spot in the scal federalism literature on tax externalities, where models have workers supply labour only in their state of residence. For a federation with Belgian features, where at least 10% of the workforce commutes between regions, this assumption of non-integrated regional labour markets becomes dicult to maintain.
We therefore presented a theoretical model based on a common labour market, where wages are endogenously determined as commuting ows equilibrate wages across all states of a federation. Policy changes in one state will consequently be felt throughout the entire federal system, even when household migration does not occur. We thus model a situation where horizontal externalities are re-introduced to the analysis through commuting eects.
25 Since the scal capacity dierences are entirely equalised in the proposed scheme, we have assumed full equalisation' here. Partial equalisation however, where only a fraction of the scal capacity divide is bridged, yields similar -but logically less pronounced-results.
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In other words, we translated the model of Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002) to a labour market setting. Yet by introducing an ad valorem, residence based labour tax, we also extend it.
for the overall scal externality to be negative. Low labour supply elasticities combined with highly responsive labour demand nation-wide turn out to be crucial here. However, the latter eect comes out less pronounced because taxation is ad valorem, which brings in the impact of the federation-wide gross wage increase on revenues. In other words, when taxation is levied ad valorem, undertaxation is more liable to occur than under unit taxation. For the same underlying reasons, scal equalisation is also expected to give less cause for overtaxation. 14 Appendix A.
Wage effects
A1. State taxation
We obtain the tax shifting formula from the equilibrium in the labour market:
Taking the total dierential with respect to t i of the labour market equilibrium condition
keeping in mind that ∂τi ∂ti = 1 and ∂τj ∂ti = 0 ∀j = i. Rewriting net wages in terms of the gross wage and solving further gives:
Now, since we know that:
We also know that:
And:
So that:
Plugging (33) and (34) into (32) then gives us:
Rewriting ( 
We know that, in equilibrium, ∂wi ∂τi = (1 − τ i ) ∂w ∂τi − w, so plugging in (36) then gives us:
For later purposes, we rewrite (37) in terms of regional labour supply and demand:
Under the assumption of homogeneous regions, (36) and (38) reduce to:
A2.
Federal taxation
Taking the total dierential of 31 with respect to the common, federal tax rate T yields:
Keeping in mind that ∂τi ∂T = 1 ∀i. Rewriting net wages in terms of the gross wage and solving further nally gives us:
Plugging (42) into (41) then gives us:
For later purposes, we rewrite (43) in terms of regional labour supply and demand:
Moving on to the eect on net wages, we know that, in equilibrium, ∂w
Plugging in (44) then gives us:
For later purposes, we rewrite (46) in terms of regional labour supply and demand:
Under the assumption of homogeneous regions, (44) and (46) reduce to the well known expressions for a uniform, ad valorem tax rate τ :
Second-best optimum in a`unitary' country
With states being homogeneous, the second best optimization problem can be expressed by the Lagrangian:
Leading to the following rst order conditions:
26 See e.g. Dahlby and Wilson (2003) , or Kotsogiannis and Martínez (2008) .
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Solving both conditions yields:
With nL i w+τ nL i ∂w ∂τ +τ nw ∂Li ∂w ∂w ∂τ equal to ∂R ∂τ
, being the marginal eect on federal revenue by raising the labour tax. Substituting for γ then yields:
Public provision in each region will thus continue until its marginal benets equal its marginal cost, and this in terms of welfare cost as well as actual provision cost (see also
Dahlby (2008)). The RHS of the equation thus expresses the marginal welfare cost in utility terms of raising an additional euro of revenue to nance public provision in region i, multiplied by the marginal cost of actual provision (1 in our case). This expression can be reformulated to arrive at the conventional MCPF expression using Roy's identity:
Expression (51) simply states that at the unitary optimum the ad valorem tax τ is set such that the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between both the public and the private good must be equal to the MCPF. The conventional MCPF formula is thus extracted, now in monetary terms as is usual:
With subscript u standing for unitary case. Rewriting the third term of the RHS denominator as:
And plugging in the prot eect (10), we get:
Plugging in the wage eects (6) and (8), with wages and labour supply/demand dropping out (homogeneous regions), then gives us
Which gives us expression (13).
Appendix C.
Fully decentralised case
C1. Proof of Lemma 1
The decentralised optimization problem is expressed by the Lagrangian:
Giving us the following FOCs:
Therefore:
Using Roy's identity, with λ i marginal utility of income, and since
we get:
Now, since in symmetric Nash equilibrium all identical states will set an identical tax rate τ , and after plugging in the prot eect (10), we obtain
Rewriting as before, and plugging in the wage eects (5) and (9), with wages and labour supply/demand dropping out:
Rewriting yields:
Which, together with (15) characterises the symmetric Nash equilibrium.
C2.
Proof of proposition 1
To verify the sign of this bias, we compare the unitary M CP F u derived in section 3 which was unaected by externalities, to the state M CP F i captured by lemma 1:
Evaluating at the Nash-equilibrium (τ * = τ ), and looking at the denominators in (57), the state M CP F i will be perceived as larger than the unitary M CP F u if
From (58), this is easily seen to be the case in our simplied setting here. Keeping in mind that ε < 0 and η > 0, the term (nε − (n − 1)η) on the LHS of expression (58) will be larger in absolute value compared to its counterpart in the RHS which is simply ε. It then suces to take the derivative of the RHS with respect to |ε|, which is positive and equal to η ((1−τ )ε−η) 2 , to prove that the inequality always holds.
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C3.
Internalising the horizontal externalities Expression (59) gives us the MCPF of region i when all externalities are internalised. The denominator thus has the eect of a tax increase on other regions' tax revenues incorporated, whilst the numerator integrates the eect on the welfare of non-residents:
Or, rewriting:
Plugging in the prot eect (10) gives us:
, and regions are homogeneous, this becomes:
Or, since τ w
Plugging in the regional wage eects (5) and (9), and with labour supply and demand canceling out:
Wages drop out as well:
So that we get:
Which is exactly equal to the welfare cost (52) derived under the second-best unitary case:
Shared tax base
D1. Proof of lemma 2
The optimisation problem yields the same marginal rate of substitution as before in (55).
Since in symmetric Nash equilibrium all identical states will set an identical tax rate t, and after plugging in the prot eect (10), we thus obtain
Appendix E: Heterogeneous regions E1. Optimisation problem second-best optimum
The second best optimization problem is expressed by the Lagrangian:
With n i {V i (w, G i } = S. Leading to the following rst order conditions:
∂V i ∂G i − γ = 0 f or i = 1, .., n (G i ) Public provision in each region will again continue until its marginal benets equal its marginal cost, and this in terms of welfare cost as well as actual provision cost (see also Dahlby, 2008) . This expression can be reformulated to arrive at the conventional MCPF expression using Roy's identity: 
